

Opportunities and Obstacles: The State of Reconciliation:

Report of the Second Round of the SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey

May 2004

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Executive Summary

The *SA Reconciliation Barometer* project strives to provide some answers to the question of how the national reconciliation process is unfolding. This survey, conducted in October and November 2003, involved face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of 3 499 South Africans. Interviews were conducted in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, including informal settlements and deep rural areas. The survey complied with the usual scientific requirements and the results provide a highly representative basis for describing South African opinions, views and values.

Commitment to Nation-building:

- Over the course of last year there was a significant increase in an already high level of abstract commitment to nation-building.
- Although there was no change here, South Africans were also, in theory, committed to more open dialogue. Whether this willingness is being translated in to constructive dialogue and action remains to be seen, but certainly it demands more action by various stakeholders.

Race Relations:

- During 2003 there was a significant increase in the percentage of people who report never having cross-racial involuntary or voluntary social contact. Thirty-five percent of the nation never has any inadvertent cross-racial interaction, whilst 55% never socialise with people of another race.
- More encouragingly, 30% admit to wanting more frequent contact, and this is just as well as 60% of South Africans still struggle to understand people of other races. The data does not point to a decrease in this portion in the near future.
- Moreover, around 40% of South Africans find members of other races inherently untrustworthy.
- Breaking down such barriers based on generalised preconceptions and hardened stereotypes take time. The two-thirds of the population that support integrated schools may be a good place to start

Development of a Human Rights Culture:

- About a third of all South Africans admit to choosing an extra-legal route to solving problems rather than waiting for a legal outcome, whilst about a quarter think they do not have to obey laws made by a government they did not vote for.
- Although it is encouraging that levels of disrespect for the rule of law have not risen in the period under review, this is certainly a dimension of reconciliation in which a great deal more work is necessary.

Threats to Human Security:

- Approximately half of all black South Africans are optimistic of an improvement in their physical, economic and cultural security.
- Indians and Coloureds are significantly less optimistic about future levels of economic, physical and cultural threats.
- Only 10% of Whites expect an improvement in levels of physical threat, whilst 30% are economically optimistic and 18% culturally so.

Biggest National Divisions:

- South Africans themselves most frequently identify class as the biggest split the nation faces today.
- This almost equally frequent mention of racial discord, rifts based on HIV/Aids status and the division between political party supporters.

1. Introduction

With the third democratic elections marking the end of the first decade of post-apartheid South Africa, the question of how the country is doing is frequently asked.

This ten-year milestone has given rise to a plethora of “10 Years of Democracy” assessments. The government has undertaken its own “Ten Year Review” of progress in implementing and delivering on its programmes. Analysts are engaging in retrospective reviews of the nation’s democratic consolidation process and the economy’s path towards sustainable growth, transformation, stability and greater equity.

Amidst this wealth of research, a gap has become evident. There is a need to determine what progress has been made in reconciliation since 1994? Has South Africa developed an enduring human right’s culture? Is sufficient dialogue transpiring? Are South Africans still imprisoned by their past? What are the essential obstacles and opportunities for reconciliation? Are South Africans learning to live together?

These questions of people’s perceptions and mindsets are crucial. A 1996 Editorial in the *Irish News* proclaimed: "In this country perceptions and realities have the same potency." This is a human reality in most countries. It is often not the actual circumstances, but perceptions of these circumstances that lead to wars, to reconciliation, to revolutions or conflict resolution. People interpret reality differently. They perceive differences in the severity, causes and consequences of problems, be they social, political, economic or otherwise.

It is therefore critical not only to measure actual circumstances that have a bearing on reconciliation (be it the state of the economy, the form of the political system or election outcomes), but also to examine and monitor people’s perceptions of their circumstances. Speaking about the factors that can affect the reconciliation process, Bloomfield argues that “this does not only relate to what happened in the past (the history); equally important are people’s perceptions of what happened in the past (the mythology)”.¹

Yet these kinds of questions, frequently asked by South Africans and those concerned about South Africa, rarely elicit concise, informed and accurate answers. A number of reviews have attempted to provide some useful insight. Most, however, take the form of anecdotal analyses based on the analysts’ observations of small groups of people’s behaviour, views, attitudes and values.

To date, little attempt has been made to empirically quantify such developments for the nation as a whole. The *SA Reconciliation Barometer* examines how South Africans at all levels of society react towards one another and the changing political and economic landscape. The Barometer monitors the social mood of the nation as it evaluates the intensifying impact of realities such as poverty, HIV/Aids and unemployment on South Africa’s fragile democracy.

¹ Bloomfield, D (2003) “The Context of Reconciliation” in Bloomfield, D, Barnes, T and L. Huyse (eds) (2003) *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Sweden. Pp. 40.

Any monitoring of a process requires time-series data that can show short-term fluctuations and long-term changes. The *SA Reconciliation Barometer* is by necessity a longitudinal study. This report, which gives an account of the second round of the bi-annual national survey, describes the first suggestions of possible trends in the reconciliation process.

2. Approach

. When embarking on the task of ‘measuring’ a process that is as subjective and contested as reconciliation, certain inherent shortcomings should not be ignored. These range from the need to oversimplify certain dimensions of the reconciliation process for the sake of measurability, to having to focus on only a select few facets of this complex and multi-dimensional concept.

There is, however, a need to conduct rigorous empirical research on the progression of the national reconciliation process. But, as is the case with all exploratory research (whether of a quantitative or qualitative nature), a cautionary approach should be employed. The obvious danger of excessive reductionism in translating such a complex process in relation to a handful of critical indicators is recognized. This research by no means asserts that reconciliation is solely composed of these critical dimensions and is no bigger than the sum of its parts. On the contrary, this research recognizes the definitional and contextual ambiguity of the process. It is a first attempt at some necessary comparable quantification of the national reconciliation process.

Additionally it is important to bear in mind that a difference in results between two consecutive public opinion surveys does not necessarily represent a trend. Even in cases where change has been tremendous, two measurements do not provide sufficient evidence to assume the presence of a trend. Such changes should be treated as fluctuations; the absence or presence of trends will be confirmed by data emanating from the third round of the survey, which is presently in the field.

3. Survey Design

The analysis that follows is based on a survey of adult South Africans conducted between the 17th October and the 11th of November 2003. Markinor undertook the fieldwork for the survey and the information was obtained by adding a substantial set of questions to Markinor's MBus (an omnibus survey conducted on a nationally representative sample of South Africans aimed at measuring socio-political trends). Face to face interviews were conducted with 3,499 South Africans. The sample is representative of the entire South African population, 16 years and older, within a 2.3% margin of error.

The survey instrument was first prepared in English and then translated into Afrikaans, Xhosa, Zulu, North Sotho, South Sotho and Setswana. As a result, respondents were interviewed in the language of their choice. No respondent was interviewed by an interviewer belonging to a different racial group than the one they belonged to. The average M-Bus interview lasted 73.1 minutes, whilst the median interview time was 71 minutes.

A formal pre-test of the questionnaire was conducted on a convenient sample of seventy-five South Africans. Soft quotas were utilised to create a sample that closely

resembles the probable proportions of these characteristics in the population as a whole. Thirty-five of the interviews were conducted in the Western Cape, whilst forty occurred in Gauteng, with at least 10 interviews conducted in each of the 7 official survey languages. In light of the pre-test outcome and interviewer feedback, a number of questions were re-worded, others were completely omitted and the order of some questions was changed.

To allow for statistical analysis of interracial differences, four distinct sub-samples, (one for each race group), were drawn by applying multistage stratification procedures. The numbers of completed interviews for Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Indians are 2000, 938, 391, and 170 respectively. The sample covers both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, and respondents included people residing in informal settlements, deep rural areas, and those living in multi-member households.

The black sample was created through a geographical area-probability sampling procedure. The coloured, white and indian samples were created through area-stratified sampling procedures according to region, town, suburb and community size, with randomly selected sampling points. The smaller size of the white, coloured and indian samples demanded that the samples at each sampling point be quota controlled for gender, age and working status.

The accuracy of 9.7% of all interviews was verified through a personal backcheck, whilst 19.3% of the remainder of completed interviews was checked telephonically.

Some population groups are over-sampled to allow a sufficient number of cases to allow for statistically significant results. Due to the fact that some population sub-samples are not selected proportional to their size in the greater South African population, it is necessary to weight the data after data entry to render it more representative of the population as a whole. The South African Advertising Research Foundations (SAARF) All Media Product Survey (AMPS 2002B) data was used to do this. The table below reports the racial composition of the sample before and after weighting, as well as the estimated composition of the entire South African population.

Table 1: Racial Composition of Sample

	Racial composition of respondents interviewed (%)	Racial composition of weighted sample (%)	Racial composition of South African Population (%) ²
Black	56.8	74.8	79
White	27.1	14.2	9.6
Coloured	11.3	8.5	8.9
Indian	4.9	2.5	2.5

It should be noted that in making reference to South African racial sub-groups as Black, White, Indian and Coloured, no approval of the Apartheid-era classification system or its underlying theory of race is intended. The nature of present day South African society still bears the scars of its apartheid past, and, as such, substantial differences between the conditions and orientations of the four main racial groups often persist and need to be rigorously analysed.

² 2001 Census. Stats SA.

When reading the analysed data outputs one should bear in mind that both the April 2003 and November 2003 data sets have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 2.3%, resulting in a combined margin of error of 4.6%. To ensure that all changes noted in this report are significant and not the result of some form of measurement error, a difference of 8% or greater has been identified as the cut-off point. Many social scientists only deem changes greater than 10% significant. This longitudinal survey has, however, been designed to reflect both short-term fluctuations and long-term trends and successive rounds of the surveys have a very short lapse time of only approximately six months, rendering the 8% cut-off acceptable.

4. Conceptual Clarity of Reconciliation

4.1. Meanings of Reconciliation

Reconciliation as a concept has no neat explication, no clearly defined definition and no undisputed meanings. One of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's primary architects, MP Johnny De Lange, once proclaimed that he had never met "two people with the same definition of reconciliation".³

The literature and academic debate on reconciliation in the South African context offers multiple definitions or paradigms of reconciliation, and many of these paradigms are not mutually exclusive. The following offers a brief description of the most commonly used meanings of the concept in South Africa.

The two most prominent meanings of reconciliation promoted in post-apartheid South Africa are those ascribing to the non-racial and multi-cultural schools of thought. The multicultural model is based on the notion that South Africa is composed of a conglomeration of different cultures and histories. As such, the reconciliation process seeks to bridge the past, whilst simultaneously bridging the divisions between different communities. The aim is to create a society where citizens and communities live together in a peaceful and tolerant manner, whilst respecting and even celebrating diversity.

The vision of the non-racial ideology entails "dissolving the racial identities arising from the policies of the past and implores the TRC [*and other such efforts*] to convert people...into non-racial citizens within a harmoniously integrated social setting".⁴ Theoretically this model of reconciliation speaks to disbanding pre-apartheid identities and re-constructing new, non-racial ones.

An additional model is the Human Rights model, which sets the bar far lower. Gerwel, a prominent proponent of this paradigm, argues that reconciliation requires "the institutionalisation of consensus seeking".⁵ This model suggests that social interaction needs to be governed by the rule of law, largely to prevent the atrocities of the past from being repeated. It involves the creation of the so-called 'minimally decent society', where

³ Reported in Doxtader, E. (2002) 'Is it 'Reconciliation' if we say it is? Discerning the Rhetorical Problem in the South African Transition.' An unpublished paper. Pp. 2

⁴ Hamber, B. (2002) "Ere their story die": truth, justice and reconciliation in South Africa" in *Race & Class*. Vol. 44, Iss. 1, Pp. 66.

⁵ Gerwel, J (2000) "Anticipating a Different Kind of Future" in Villa -Vicencio (ed)(2000) *Transcending a Century of Injustice*. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: Cape Town. Pp. 122.

normative and legal boundaries control interaction and create the space for peaceful coexistence.

Whilst the path of the reconciliation process for the human rights paradigm moves from the macro to the micro, another model, the religious model, focuses on an approach that speaks about concentric circles of reconciliation, working from the individual to the societal level. Notions of truth and forgiveness are undeniably central to this model.

Another paradigm is that of *ubuntu*, which asserts that all community members share a common humanity, and by denying the common humanity of others, the community and its members are dehumanised.⁶ While there is some overlap between the religious and *ubuntu* paradigms, a great deal of emphasis in *ubuntu*, is placed on the interconnectedness of individuals. The re-integration of perpetrators into the community is seen as an act that restores the entire community to peace.

In some ways the developmental paradigm of transformation is diametrically opposed to the more subjective approach to reconciliation promoted by the *ubuntu* and religious models for reconciliation. The developmental paradigm advocates the remedying of historically induced inequalities, whilst simultaneously advocating a strategy of cooperation for the social and economic development of the nation. This model sees the subjective restoration or reconciliation of relationships as following naturally (or, at minimum, more easily) from a restitution process. This model requires an acknowledgment of past injustice and the willingness to redress the broad-scale injustices that continue to skew advantages in present day South Africa.

The developmental paradigm is quite distinct from the transformation model and is potentially the most ambitious and far-reaching of all the paradigms. Advocates of this interpretation assert that reconciliation requires structural and systemic adjustments, which include institutionalising a new post-apartheid value system, structure and political culture, as well as wide-ranging reparations. This model advocates that reconciliation cannot “develop in a sustainable way if structural injustice in the political, legal and economic domains remain”.⁷ As such, this model prescribes that it is impossible to change the relationships in a post-conflict society if the material, structural and valuative conditions under which these relationships were created remain unchanged.⁸

4.2. Individual or Political Reconciliation?

Another critical distinction is important. Amongst others,⁹ Borer cautions about the lack of conceptual clarity between differing levels of reconciliation, encouraging a

⁶ Tutu, D. M. (1999) *No Future without Forgiveness*. Random House: New York.

⁷ Huyse, L. (2003) “The Process of Reconciliation” in Bloomfield, D, Barnes, T and Huyse, L. (eds) (2003) *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Sweden. Pp. 21.

⁸ Esterhuyse, W (2000) “Truth as a trigger for transformation: from apartheid injustice to transformational justice” in Villa-Vicencio, C and Verwoerd, W. (eds) (2000) *Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*. University of Cape Town Press: Cape Town.

⁹ Hayner, P. B (2001) *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity*. Routledge: New York.. Pp. 155; Villa-Vicencio, C. (2003) “The Politics of Reconciliation.” Unpublished paper. Pp. 3.

conceptual separation between *interpersonal* reconciliation – between victims and perpetrators, for example- and *national or societal* reconciliation.¹⁰

According to Villa-Vicencio the critical distinction between political and individual reconciliation revolves around the fact that ‘political reconciliation can forego the psychological and moral challenges that many aggrieved individuals face, but often choose never to deal with in a thoroughgoing manner’.¹¹ Political reconciliation provides the process through which to address and confront the issues that continue to impede sustainable peace. Bloomfield places this form of reconciliation at the heart of democratic politics.¹² Ultimately political reconciliation demands a more socio-economically just and equitable society, characterized by an enduring human rights culture, respect for the rule of law and trust in political institutions.

5. Unpacking Reconciliation

There is no way of directly measuring reconciliation. As a result the *SA Reconciliation Barometer* research works at two levels, the theoretical and empirical. The theoretical question of how the reconciliation process is unfolding will be inferred on the basis of the empirical evidence contained in the data gathered from the questionnaires. In order to measure South Africa’s progress along the path of reconciliation, this intangible concept was unpacked in relation to a number of critical indicators, each of which will be monitored and its progression regularly benchmarked.

Table 2: Conceptual Overview of Reconciliation Indicators

Hypotheses	Indicators
Human Security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Physical Security ➤ Economic Security ➤ Cultural Security
Political Culture: If citizens view the Institutions, Structures and Values of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to progress.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Justifiability of Extra-legal Action¹³ ➤ Legitimacy of Leadership¹⁴ ➤ Legitimacy of Parliament ➤ Respect for the Rule of Law
Cross-cutting Political Relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commitment to National Unity ➤ Commitment to multi-racial Political Parties
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Commitment to more dialogue

¹⁰ Borer, T.A. (2001) ‘Reconciliation in South Africa. Defining Success.’ *Kroc Institute Occasional Paper* 20:OP:1. March 2001.Pp. 9.

¹¹ Villa-Vicencio, C. (2003) ‘The Politics of Reconciliation.’ Unpublished paper. Pp. 3.

¹² Bloomfield, D (2003) ‘Reconciliation: An Introduction’ in Bloomfield, D, Barnes, T and Huyse, L. (eds) (2003) *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Sweden. Pp. 11.

¹³ These questions were not included in this round of the *SA Reconciliation Barometer* and shall therefore not be discussed in this report.

¹⁴ See 13.

likely to be advanced.	
Historical Confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Acknowledgement of Injustice of Apartheid ➤ Forgiveness ➤ Reduced levels of Vengeance¹⁵
Race Relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cross-racial Contact ➤ Cross-racial Perceptions ➤ Cross-racial Social Distance

Table 2 depicts a conceptual overview of the critical indicators. It is hypothesized that when these strengthen or improve, reconciliation is likely to be advanced. The process of distilling a number of key indicators for reconciliation is a tricky undertaking.¹⁶ In this instance the decisions were made by means of a consultative process, and included an analysis of the results of an exploratory national survey conducted in late 2002; numerous critical discussions with academics, researchers, social theorists and practitioners working in the field and an extensive literature review. Some elements of each of the definitions discussed previously were included. The conceptual logic of the inclusion of each of the individual indicators will be expanded on in the relevant sections of the report.

6. Nature of the Division

Before embarking on an analysis of these indicators, it is critical to ask which South Africans need to learn to live together. The superficial assumption that it is only black and white South Africans who need to reconcile is often made. In reality, South Africa has many layers of division, some of which are superimposed on each other and others that cut across one another. These lines of division are also not static.

Many long-standing divisions were overshadowed in the past by the prominent and institutionalised divide between Black and White, and may now, in the post-apartheid era, develop and periodically flare up into various forms of overt conflict. At the same time, an entire range of new identities and struggles have emerged in the aftermath of the move towards democratic rule, and they too have the potential to create conflict.

The last decade has witnessed HIV/Aids infection rates reaching crisis levels. The two most recent measures of the extent of the problem yield significantly different results. At the end of 2002 the Department of Health research estimated an HIV prevalence rate of 26.5% amongst sexually active women aged from 15 to 49,¹⁷ while the Nelson Mandela/HSRC Study of HIV/AIDS estimated an HIV prevalence rate of 11.4% across the general population.¹⁸ Statistical differences aside, the problem of HIV/Aids is spiraling out of control and the present and future impact of the disease on every sphere of South African life can no longer be ignored.

¹⁵ See 13.


¹⁶ This statistical testing of the validity of this hypothesis will constitute the basis of the next SA Reconciliation Barometer research report.

¹⁷ Department of Health (2003) National HIV and Syphilis Sero-prevalence Survey of Women Attending Public Antenatal Clinics in South Africa - 2002, Summary Report. <http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/reports/>

¹⁸ Nelson Mandela/HSRC Study of HIV/AIDS: South African National HIV Prevalence, Behavioural Risks and Mass Media Household Survey 2002. <http://www.hsrepublics.co.za/hiv.html>

At the same time, levels of economic inequality continue to burden the country. Whiteford and Van Seventer estimated South Africa's Gini coefficient, as an indicator of income inequality, at 0.68 in 1999,¹⁹ whilst Gelb estimated it at 0.57 in 2000.²⁰ Methodological issues aside, most economists agree that South Africa's economic benefits are highly skewed, and that overall the country ranks as one of the most grossly unequal societies in the world.²¹

Graph 1: The Biggest Lines of Division identified by respondents April & Nov 2003.



Question asked: *What, in your experience, is the biggest division in South Africa today?* (Closed ended question with 6 options of answers.)

In light of all these developments, many analysts have offered their subjective analysis of where the greatest need for reconciliation lies. This research focused on

¹⁹ Whiteford, A. & Van Seventer, D. (1999) *Winners and losers: South Africa's changing income distribution in the 1990s*. Pretoria: WEFA.

²⁰ Gelb, S. (2003) 'Inequality in South Africa: Nature, causes and Responses.' Dfid Policy Initiative on Addressing Inequality in Middle Income Countries. Johannesburg. November 2003. Pp. 6.

²¹ McCord, A (2004) 'Overview of the South African Economy' in *Human resources development review 2003: education, employment and skills in South Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Pp. 37.


investigating where South Africans themselves see the biggest divisions, and consequent biggest need for some form of recourse.

The period under review yielded no significant change in the divisions identified by the public. The greatest portion (about a third) selected the class divide, followed closely by the divide between races, the HIV/Aids infected and uninfected and political party supporters. Divisions along linguistic and religious lines remain salient for only a marginal portion of South Africans.

The Election Observer Mission (EOM) report released after the peaceful culmination of the recently completed national and provincial elections, described the event as having been “conducted in a peaceful, orderly and transparent manner”.²² Amongst other factors, this may eventually result in a significant decrease in the portion identifying political division. But for the moment, no such significant trend is discernible. However, the possibility of the current tensions between key Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and African National Congress (ANC) leaders in the aftermath of the election outcome, erupting into more concrete forms of conflict, could have the opposite effect.

Even though the data at present does not reveal any significant fluctuations, it will have to be closely monitored in consequent rounds of the survey to ensure that any potentially problematic trends are timeously identified. In the absence of any convincing evidence of change, it can only be concluded that racial, HIV/Aids-based and political divisions are seen as important for many, but that South Africans themselves most frequently identified the wealth gap as the biggest division facing the nation.

Graph 2: The Biggest Lines of Division April & Nov 2003 (by race).



Question asked: *What, in your experience, is the biggest division in South Africa today?* (Closed ended question with 6 options of answers.)

²² Mail & Guardian, 29 April 2004.

Despite the lack of significant overall difference in opinion between the two surveys, clear inter-racial differences and intra-racial differences over time are evident. A prominent distributional feature of the graph is the inter-racial difference in the prioritization of different divisions.

This is most evident in the varying frequencies with which class is identified as the most prominent rift. White South Africans most frequently selected race as the biggest division, whilst the subjective divisions resulting from the HIV/Aids pandemic are significantly less frequently mentioned by Whites and Indians, compared to Coloureds and Blacks. The wealth gap is more frequently identified amongst coloured South Africans than any other group, and in fact rose significantly over the course of last year.

The sophistication of this data should not be overestimated. The benefit of using a national survey methodology is a countrywide overview of where South Africans see the biggest rifts. The disadvantage is the potential cost of losing detail, as well as the finer nuances of individual's opinions. The question forced respondents to select only the most important division, without much room for ambiguity, overlap or more localized divisions.

Despite these constraints, the empirical evidence of the divisions within the nation that are in need of reconciliation (as determined by the views of a representative sample of ordinary South Africans), was critical in the expansion of the survey instrument. The more comprehensive survey instrument, to be used for the third round, aims to provide improved data on the complex relationship between the material divide imposed by extreme economic inequality and various subjective divisions retarding the nation's reconciliation process.

7. Human Security

The past decade has witnessed the expansion of the concept of security to encompass the notion of human security. According to the Commission on Human Security *Human Security Now* Report, it involves "creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity".²³ A threat to human security is counterproductive for reconciliation in that it retards the capacity of societies to re-integrate in a sustainable manner.

A perceived absence of sufficient human security can be destructive at a number of levels. People who perceive their short- or long- term survival, dignity or livelihood to be threatened, are more likely to be distrustful or suspicious of others. Furthermore, they are more likely to develop hostility towards other groups suspected of being the cause of this threat.

Some conflict mediators, most notably Kraybill, also argue that post-conflict societies need a socially and physically safe environment for people, whether they are a beneficiary, victim, perpetrator or otherwise, to redefine themselves and their future path, before they are ready to attempt to reconcile with others.²⁴ Although no hard empirical

²³ Ogata, S. and Sen, A. (2003) *Human Security Now*. Report of the Commission on Human Security. New York.

²⁴ Krog, A (1998) 'South Africa: On the Tortured Road to Reconciliation' in the *Cape Argus*, 22 July 2003.

proof exists, anecdotal analysis suggests that a perceived threat to human security creates a setting in which reconciliation is less likely to progress.

The *SA Reconciliation Barometer* instrument included a number of items to test this hypothesis. Three specific threats to human security have been selected, the first two respectively representing concerns for economic survival (in light of increasing poverty and unemployment) and personal safety (in light of high levels of crime). The third dimension concerns perceptions of increasing threats to minority groups' cultural, linguistic and religious survival.

These concerns are presumably only important to specific groups of South Africans, but the recent alleged actions of the *Boeremag* (and their presumed reasons for perpetrating these crimes) are just some examples that demonstrate how important this threat is to specific groups of South Africans. This builds a strong case to monitor such trends on the grounds that these extremist groups appear to have the capacity to cause considerable damage to the national reconciliation process.²⁵

7.1. Physical Threat

Alongside the threat of a new groundswell of old violent conflicts, transitional and young post-transitional societies are also at risk of falling prey to new forms of violence that also undermine and weaken efforts to stabilize society. The fact that reconciliation can only occur when 'the shooting stops' is obvious, but less obvious and more complicated are the host of other threats and challenges to citizen's security that also have a bearing on reconciliation.

Even a casual inspection of any national Newspaper will reveal that South Africans feel threatened, some by high crime levels, others by escalating levels of domestic violence. A recent Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University national poll reveals that more than four in ten South Africans (43%) say crime is one of the most important problems for the government to address. Additionally, a massive 81% of South Africans thought crime is a serious threat to democracy.²⁶

According to the Institute's manual titled *Learning to Live Together*, there are at least five ways in which crime obstructs reconciliation. It 'undermines public trust in nation-building, it creates more victims and more trauma, it reinforces apartheid segregation and socio-economic inequality, it entrenches racial prejudice and it undermines social stability and tolerance'.²⁷ Simpson speaks of the new patterns of violent crime in South Africa as 'new vehicles for re-racialising and physically and emotionally re-dividing the 'new' South Africa'. According to him crime can also serve as a vehicle for popular outrage, which also hinders social stability and the reconciliation process.²⁸


²⁵ Schoenteich, M. and Boshoff, H. (2003) "Volk, Faith and Fatherland". Institute for Security Studies Monograph No. 81. March 2003. Pp. 56.

²⁶ *Survey of South Africans at Ten Years of Democracy*. (2004) Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University. March 2004.

²⁷ Du Toit, F (ed) (2003) *Learning to Live Together: Practices of Social Reconciliation*. Rondebosch: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Pp. 119.

²⁸ Simpson, G (2002) "Uncivil Society": Challenges for reconciliation and justice in South Africa" Paper presented at the Stockholm International Forum Conference on Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Stockholm, Sweden, 23 – 24 April 2002.

Graph 3: Expectations of Improvements in General Levels of Safety (by race).



Question asked: *How do you think the general level of safety of South Africans will change during the next twelve months?* (Percentage who thought it would get better)


The general perception that current levels of physical threat are high is likely to be detrimental to reconciliation. But people may be willing to bear temporary hardship if they expect future improvements. Therefore it is pivotal to monitor whether South Africans expect a deterioration or improvement in their personal and general levels of safety and security.

In the case of both questions, one referring to the personal safety of people like you, and the other to the general levels of safety of South Africans, there was no significant change between April and November 2003. The differences in opinion across race groups, however, are certainly significant. The disaggregated data reveals that over and above Whites being the only group not reflecting this upswing, they also have the smallest proportion of optimists. Indian South Africans, on the other hand, started at an equally low level of optimism in April but showed a significant increase (more than 10%) in the percentage expecting some improvement.

The far greater extent of pessimism amongst Whites does not bode well for reconciliation. Possible repercussions of this include increasing isolation and withdrawal from the larger society, often through the building of higher walls, electric fences and lately even the booming-off of whole suburbs. Another frequent response is emigration. It is possible that predominantly white residents of the suburbs may react to crime by “seeking to insulate themselves physically from the mainly black poor who are seen as its perpetrators. That would entrench a form of social distance which will impede attempts to create a common South African loyalty”.²⁹

²⁹ Shaw, M, (1997) ‘South Africa; Crime in Transition’. Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper No 17. March 1997

Graph 4: Expectations of Improvements in Personal Safety by Race



Question asked: *How do you think the personal safety of people like you will change during the next two years?* (Percentage who thought it would get better)

Among the poor, who often face the double whammy of insufficient financial resources to obtain private security measures whilst being at the mercy of inferior levels of state-sponsored security provision, fears of increased levels of assault on personal security can result in increased vigilante action.

Whether resulting in increased vigilante justice, emigration or increasing isolation, the data fortunately does not point to any significant national increase in fear for future personal security. If the April 2004 round of the survey presently in the field concretises the thus far insignificant upward fluctuation in confidence into a positive trend, this improvement may have positive spin offs for the levels of confidence in the criminal justice system and, by association, the government and the order it creates. This, in turn, could have a positive influence on levels of public participation, emigration rates, as well as discouraging increased capital flight and the brain drain.

For the moment, however, opinion seems relatively static with between 20 and 25% of all South Africans still expecting to witness some deterioration in safety levels, 45% expecting an improvement in their personal safety and 40% an improvement in general levels of safety, and the rest expecting no change. Despite the evidence of high levels of crime, almost half of all South Africans still appear cautiously hopeful of an improvement.

7.2. Economic Threat

The changes in South Africa's economic policies have had the positive impact of reducing inflation, national debt and the budget deficit, while the country's export performance has improved. The relative stability of the country's economy amidst global volatility, together with the strengthening of the Rand have featured positively, whilst South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown steadily since 1999. The

government's synthesis report on the implementation of its programmes *Towards a Ten Year Review* cites an increase in expenditure on social grants to the tune of 24.8 billion between 1994 and 2003, with the number of beneficiaries having grown from 2.6 million to 6.8 million.³⁰ Overall it would appear that macro-economic stability and some economic growth has been attained, whilst the state-sponsored welfare net has expanded substantially.

The table below gives some indication of the patterns and shifts in unemployment over the period between 1995 and 2002. These trends jar harshly against the positive macro-economic advances described previously.

Table 3: Official Definition Estimates of key labour market trends (1995 and 2002)

Category	1995	2002	change	% change
Employment	9 557 185	11 157 818	1 600 633	16.75
Unemployment (strict definition)	1 909 468	4 271 302	2 361 834	123.69
Labour force	11 466 653	15 429 120	3 962 467	34.56

Sources: *October Household Survey, 1995 & Labour Force Survey, February 2002*

Dr Iraj Abedian, Chief Economist of Standard Bank, recently noted that heated debates about how to define unemployment were somewhat missing the point. Arguing about whether the unemployment rate was more accurately placed at 30% or 40% misses the central issue, namely that of a system in crisis.

Increasingly South Africans must be feeling the effect of rising unemployment levels. The trend of rising unemployment and poverty levels appears to invoke less pessimism amongst South Africans than the more ominous situation of increased fears about threats to physical security.


South Africans are significantly more confident about their economic survival than about their physical security. The period between the two surveys witnessed an increase of 8% in the percentage of citizens expecting an improvement in general economic circumstances.

This optimism amongst financially comfortable South Africans was, no doubt, largely influenced by a changed view of the South African Rand. Amidst global economic volatility, even 'stable' foreign currencies and foreign economies under performed and it became evident that the Rand can become a solid repository of value. Expectations of even more improvements were probably also linked to tax cuts and the numerous drops in interest rates that occurred during the course of 2003.

Amongst middle-class and poorer South Africans this view may have been the result of a levelling out of inflation, which would have had a big effect on food prices in particular. It is also likely that an increase in the government's capacity to deliver its social grants, as well as the incremental increase in the age of children qualifying for the Child Grant, may have had a positive effect.

³⁰ *Towards a Ten Year review: Synthesis Report on Implementation of Government Programmes.*(2003) Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), The Presidency. October 2003.


Graph 5: Expectation of Improvements in general economic situation (by race).



Question asked: *How do you think the economic situation in South Africa will change during the next twelve months?* (Percentage who thought it would get better)

In terms of their expectations for their personal economic and financial stability, more than half of all South Africans expect an improvement in the next two years. Whether this optimism is pinned on desperate hope for a situation that ‘can only get better’, or whether this represents a realistic assessment of the economy is unclear. Be that as it may, the majority of South Africans are certainly not expecting an economic meltdown.

Graph 6: Expectation of Improvement in personal economic situation (by race).



Question asked: *How do you think the economic situation of people like you will change during the next two years?* (Percentage who thought it would get better)

Broken down by race, the data reveals that 11% more coloured South Africans expected an improvement in both the national economy and their personal economic circumstances in November 2003 than April 2003. The origin of this increased optimism is not clear. None of the other racial groups revealed any such significant intensification in confidence in the economy.

Once again, great differences in general levels of confidence between the racial groups exist. Whites are far less hopeful about an improved economic future, with the proportion of optimists in every other racial group being about double that of those within the white group.

A comparison of actual economic circumstances, (providing indications of real levels of economic threat), and reported fears of future economic hardships presents an interesting juxtaposition. Research has revealed that in 2000 the per capita income of Blacks was R7 283, compared to R14 126 for Coloureds, R23 938 for Indians and R62 360 for Whites.³¹ Moreover, between 1995 and 1999 only 27% of African jobseekers were absorbed in the labour force, a figure that contrasts sharply with the 50% absorption rate for Indians, 70% absorption rate for Coloureds and 75% absorptions rates for Whites.³²

On average it appears far less likely that the economic security of Whites will be threatened, yet the average white South African appears least optimistic about their future economic standing than any other race group.

This White pessimism may need to be viewed in light of the very income and employment differences described above. On average, Whites evaluate their future economic welfare from a relatively high level of financial prosperity, and in the face of a policy direction that may appear to directly threaten their well-being. These policies include Affirmative Action, Employment Equity, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment and Preferential Procurement. On average, black, coloured and indian South Africans, view their future from the vantage point of relative poverty, whilst the mentioned policy initiatives are designed to facilitate the economic advancement of previously disadvantaged South Africans.

Interesting racial differences aside, the data suggests a slight upward fluctuation in economic optimism, which can bode well for reconciliation. Some social commentators argue that a democratic, reconciling society, even in the modest sense of attaining sufficient consensus to allow for open decision-making, is a state which some suggest cannot survive in a grossly unequal society. Disillusionment with the fruits of democracy and reconciliation would certainly be detrimental to the reconciliation process, but a sense of optimism for future economic prosperity suggests citizens are still optimistic about reconciliation bringing long-term economic benefits

Unfortunately this positive fluctuation does not hold true for White South Africans, who still reveal a high degree of cynicism about their economic future. A

³¹ Van Den Berg, S & Louw, M. (2003) *Changing Patterns of South African Income Distribution: Towards time-series estimates of distribution and poverty*. Paper presented at the Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa, Stellenbosch. 17 – 19 September 2003. Pp. 11.

³² McCord, A & Borhat, H. (2003) 'Employment and Labour Market Trends' in *Human resources development review 2003: education, employment and skills in South Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Pp. 122.

potential consequence of this threat for the country as a whole is the fact that white South Africans, many of whom still control a great deal of financial and human capital, emigrate for fear of their future economic well-being, taking with them the skills and resources needed for economic growth and development in the country.

Less obvious, though no less important, is the impact of the between 15 and 17% of South Africans that expect a deterioration in economic circumstances. This can breed resentment, perceptions of unfairness and a general lack of confidence in the country. If people are feeling threatened – if they perceive that others ‘are doing something to us’, reconciliation is problematised. Black South Africans could perceive threats to their future economic security as stemming from the situation whereby political freedoms and opportunities are now afforded to all South Africans, but economic opportunities and benefits are still reserved for Whites.

Whites, on the other hand, could lay the blame for their worries about future economic survival on policies such as Affirmative Action, which they may perceive as a form of ‘reverse apartheid’.

Coloureds and Indians are likely to believe the by now often uttered mantra that during apartheid they were ‘too Black’ and in the new South Africa they are ‘too White’, and are therefore always going to be economically disadvantaged. These situations have the capacity to breed bitterness, resentment and anger, all of which impede increased understanding and trust, thereby retarding the reconciliation process.

7.3. Cultural Threat


It can be argued that economic and physical threats, both of which are primary needs paramount for basic survival, cannot possibly be equated with threats to people’s culture. The Institute’s ongoing research into the link between identity, culture and violence, however, suggests that fears of cultural alienation have become increasingly worrying for certain South Africans, most prominently for members of minority groups.

While the multi-cultural paradigm of reconciliation advocates the respect and celebration of diversity, and the protection of minority groups rights is emphasized in the Constitution,³³ a certain degree of fear of government or societal action to curb the freedom of specific communities to freely practice their language or religion has surfaced. This became evident during recent actions of the *Boeremag*, presently on trial for high treason. This view was strongly supported by the Group of 63 Afrikaaner think-tank, which has argued that the *Boeremag*’s acts should be viewed as a “symptom of serious alienation among Afrikaners resulting from the present political dispensation”.

Despite such arguments, it would seem the rational argument that the majority of South Africans would be far more concerned with their economic and physical security than their cultural survival holds true. Less than 10% of South Africans fear some deterioration in people’s respect for their language and religion, or fear increased interference or decreased government support that would curtail their group’s ability to practice their language or religion.

³³ Section 6 recognizes eleven official languages.


Graph 7: Expected Improvement in people's respect for religious or language groups.



Question asked: *In the next twelve months, do you think other people's respect for your religious or language group will...* (Percentage who thought it would get better)

Moreover, almost half of all South Africans are uncertain or have no expectations in this regard. Additionally there has been no change in people's views on this matter, despite the high prominence of issues of cultural alienation, both nationally and internationally.


Graph 8: Expected Improvement in ability to practice religion or language without interference (by race).



Question asked: *In the next twelve months, do you think the situation of these many different language and religious groups being able to practice their religion or language without interference will...* (Percentage who thought it would get better)

Developments that could have brought issues of threat to minority cultures to the fore include: the controversial merger of a number of tertiary education institutions having an effect on the language policies of some Universities, like Rand Afrikaanse Universiteit (RAU), often viewed as the bastions of Afrikaanedom and, of course, the highly publicized *Boeremag* treason trial.

Graph 9: Expected Improvement in government’s support for religious or language groups (by race).



Question asked: *In the next twelve months, do you think government support for these many different language and religious groups to practice their language or religion will... (Percentage who thought it would get better)*

Although no significant increase in fears of an amplified threat were reported, the three graphs reveal that the issue is vastly more worrying for Whites than any other group, with less than a fifth of all Whites expecting an improvement, compared to almost double that in all of the other racial groups.

On the whole, cultural threats appear consequential to some Whites, and possibly to some members of minority language or religious groups of other races. The fear of this threat, compared to that of others, seems far smaller and is therefore less likely to impact significantly on the reconciliation process. If, however, the alleged actions of the *Boeremag* are indeed actions of a group of people fighting for cultural survival, it is clear that these threats have the capacity to result in isolated instances of high-profile social destabilization. Although explicit identification with the *Boeremag* group has been minimal, the potential for the approximately 20% of Whites, fearful of future threats to their culture, to increase to more destabilizing levels should not be underestimated. But, cultural isolation is a problem for a far smaller portion of the South African public, and fears for economic and physical survival are far more likely to have a long-term, destructive impact on the reconciliation process.

8. Political Culture

Almond and Verba define political culture as “the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system”.³⁴ The United Nations (UN) has recently undergone a significant definitional shift that takes greater account of this notion of political culture, in that democratic states are no longer simply identified by regular free elections, but by the presence of a “democratic culture”. In a similar manner, the presence of ‘certain orientations’ can be constructive to the reconciliation process. The political culture of any nation is a complex and intricate thing. The *SA Reconciliation Barometer* has singled out some values on the assumption that these elements of the national political culture can have the biggest effect on inhibiting or promoting the reconciliation process.

The creation of a human rights culture and the general acceptance that a democracy is the optimal system to mediate conflict are central to the reconciliation process. Creating new political institutions, transformed systems of government and a reformed legislative framework will not automatically result in a democratic and reconciling society, characterised by an entrenched respect for human rights and civil liberties. Without real commitment to and trust and confidence in the systems and structures designed to facilitate democratic consolidation and reconciliation, and without deep-rooted respect for the rule of law, progress will remain negligible.

A legitimacy crisis within the new political system may prove destructive for reconciliation. Such a crisis could emerge if the citizenry were unwilling to extend their confidence, trust and unconditional support to the new dispensation, extrapolated for the purposes of this research to its institutions (Parliament). Alternatively such a situation can arise as a result of a lack of respect for the rule of law, a cornerstone of a culture of human rights.

Central to the new dispensation earning a sense of legitimacy is the forging of what has sometimes been termed ‘public trust’. This refers to the perception amongst the general public that the state and its agents are committed to the well-being and interests of its people. The Institute’s manual emphasizes the fact that during apartheid a great deal of trust and confidence in the state, its institutions, its agents and the values and norms it espoused was destroyed. The first democratic election in 1994 marked the imposition of a new and just political system, complete with a new constitution, laws, institutions, leaders and civil servants. However, “the *subjective process* of restoring trust in government, the police and other agencies had only begun”.³⁵

At the same time, the illegitimacy of the oppressive and discriminatory legislative framework, as well as the wide-ranging human rights abuses perpetrated by the state and occasionally by the liberation forces under apartheid, have in various ways contributed towards a culture in which violence, the violation of human rights and a general disrespect for the law is not simply tolerated, but often even considered necessary. As emphasized in the Human Rights paradigm of reconciliation, post-apartheid South Africa is challenged with the task of creating a new legislative and normative environment in which a culture

³⁴ Almond, GA & Verba, S. (1963) *The Civic Culture*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pp. 13.

³⁵ Du Toit, F (ed) (2003) *Learning to Live Together: Practices of Social Reconciliation*. Rondebosch: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Pp. 120.


that reveres the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law and the legitimacy of its institutions prevails.

8.1. Institutional Legitimacy

It is paramount that people support and accept the basic structures and systems on which the state is based as fair, trustworthy and legitimate, regardless of which political party is in power. Of particular importance to the reconciliation process are those structures of the democratic system that are important for the institutionalisation and mediation of conflict, as well as those critical for establishing a culture of human rights. Certainly citizens should be vigilant in their appraisal of the state, and criticise where necessary, but a lack of intrinsic support for- and commitment to- the democratic institutions, procedures and values has ramifications for whether citizens can be considered ‘reconciled with the newly implemented democratic system’.³⁶

Ideally, a further range of institutions should be surveyed, but minimal resources limit this particular survey instrument to one institution. Being staffed according to the portion of the various parties’ electoral share, parliament is often viewed as the institution of majority rule. However, in modern democracies parliament carries the responsibility of creating laws that protect and guarantee citizen’s human rights, and therefore has a critical role to play in ensuring that a legislative environment is created in which past human rights abuses can never be repeated, whilst future human rights violations are prevented. To this end the survey included items to test the extent to which the general public finds Parliament trustworthy and fair.³⁷

Graph 10: Perceived Fairness of Parliament (by race).



Question asked: The South African Parliament treats all people who come before it – Black, White, Coloured and Indian – the same. (Percentage in Agreement)


³⁶ Gibson, L.J. (2003) ‘Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?’ Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Monograph No.2 . August 2003. Pp. 7.

³⁷ These items were developed by James L. Gibson.

In light of the view that parliament is sometimes perceived as an instrument of majority rule, staffed by party elites, the impression that it functions in a fair and impartial manner is critical. The graph above reveals that as a whole, more than 40% of all South Africans are uncertain or disagree that Parliament treats all citizens equally. Although most of the graphs appear to reveal an improved perception of Parliament's fairness, these increases are insignificant, and so attitudes towards Parliament appear to have remained fairly constant.

Once again, significant, yet not unexpected, differences occur across race groups. The three minority group's evaluations are far less positive, with twice as many black than white and indian South Africans believing Parliament treats all South Africans the same. Whilst the overtly negative evaluations of the impartiality of Parliament by Whites, and to some degree Coloureds and Indians, may have been clouded by obvious feelings of vulnerability as a result of the loss or reduction in political power, the empirical fact that more than 40% of black South Africans are not sure or disagree that Parliament treats all of the citizens it is meant to represent equally, does not bode well for the legitimacy of this important institution.

Graph 11: Perceived Trustworthiness of Parliament (by race).



Question asked: *The South African Parliament can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole* (Percentage in Agreement).

On a more positive note around 60% of South Africans assert that Parliament can generally be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country, and only one in every ten blatantly disagree. As in the previous case, Whites, and to a lesser extent, Indians, appear to trust Parliament much less than black and coloured South Africans. Again changes over the six-month interlude between the two surveys are not significant, except in the case of the coloured group, where the portion deeming Parliament trustworthy has decreased by 11%. Closer examination reveals that some of that shift can be accounted for by a 4% increase in the portion undecided, but the largest part (7%) is a clear increase in overt distrust in Parliament.

This growing distrust could be attributed to a number of political scandals that racked a number of Western Cape-based politicians over the course of last year. Primary amongst these would probably be the floor-crossing period. The use of the window of opportunity created by the legal provision to “cross the floor” to other parties by a number of senior coloured Parliamentarians may have been experienced as a “sell-out” by large portions of the Coloured electorate. Public Opinion Polls conducted prior to the election revealed that 24% of coloured voters were not likely to register for the next election, a decision which political analyst Anneke Greyling attributed to a high degree of confusion as a result of the defection period and various new alliances between different political parties.³⁸ It is thus likely that politicking evoked a strong sense of betrayal, not only of the specific constituency that voted these politicians into power, but of coloured people in general.

The perceptions of Parliamentarians behaving in a morally reprehensible, untrustworthy and errant manner was probably also reinforced by a number of high-profile alleged corruption and sexual harassment cases in the Western Cape. Although other factors may also have come into play, political analyst Cherrel Africa said that “allegations of corruption, chopping and changing, the municipal and most recent provincial and national floor-crossing, had left many voters with a sense of ‘insecurity and instability’”,³⁹ and it is likely that this may have been experienced to a heightened degree by the coloured electorate.

In short, five out of ten South Africans think parliament treats all the country’s citizens equally and six in ten think it can be trusted, with little change in this sentiment over time. It is likely that South African’s critical judgment of parliament is not indicative of an overall negative assessment of the principles of democratic rule, but merely a sign of disapproval of one of the instruments of the state charged with actuating these principles. Such unfavourable evaluations of public institutions are worth noting because legal and political institutions perceived to be unfair or untrustworthy are unlikely to be accorded legitimacy. Without legitimacy, cooperation can become an issue and dedication to the reconciliation process is likely to suffer.

8.2. Respect for the Rule of Law

Whereas judgements of parliament represent an evaluation of an institution of the democratic state, the question of South Africans’ respect for the rule of law probes intrinsic support for one of the central principles of democratic rule. Taking the cue from South Africa’s greatly respected Constitution, there is clearly a need for South Africans to create a culture in which the human rights of all individuals are protected and guaranteed. Apartheid did a great deal of damage, not simply in violating people’s human rights, but also in creating an environment in which human rights could be violated with impunity.

Rectifying this situation requires far more than “a stable political, constitutional and legal framework”,⁴⁰ it needs the unequivocal commitment and support of all South Africans that human rights will be respected, regardless of the cost or implications of doing so. James Gibson argues that the “first principal” of such an unconditional


³⁸ *Mail & Guardian*, 21 July 2003.

³⁹ *Mail & Guardian*, 28 March 2003.

⁴⁰ Gerwel, J (2000) “Anticipating a different kind of Future” in Villa-Vicencio, C. (eds) (2000) *Transcending a Century of Injustice*. Cape Town: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Pp. 124.

commitment to a human rights culture is respect for the rule of law, contending that a human rights culture cannot be created, nor maintained, if there is no “commitment to the universal application of law, and especially the unwillingness to set law aside to accomplish other objectives”.⁴¹

Graph 12: A lack of Respect for the Rule of Law (by race).



Questions asked: *It is not necessary to obey laws of a government that I did not vote for (LEFT) & Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately rather than wait for a legal solution (RIGHT). (Percentage in Agreement).*

Almost a quarter of South Africans disregard the rule of law under circumstances where it is legislated and executed by a political party not of their choice, whilst a third disregard it on the grounds that it is ineffective. Moreover, an additional fifth of respondents are uncertain whether the rule of law is to be respected under such circumstances. On the whole it would seem that a sizeable chunk of the South African population do not believe in the incontestability of the rule of law. The particular historical experiences of coloured, black and indian South Africans having been faced with the dilemma of having to obey laws that were grossly immoral, may play a role in this regard.

Respect for the rule of law and the extension of legitimacy to parliament are simply two measures aimed at gauging the degree of support for a human rights culture, conducive for reconciliation. Huyse asserts that the reconciliation process must, by necessity, ‘be supported by a gradual sharing of power, an honouring of each other’s political commitments, the creation of a climate conducive to human rights and economic justice, and a willingness among the population at large to accept responsibility for the past and for the future – in other words, reconciliation must be backed by the recognition of the essential codes of democracy’.⁴² The data suggests that the values, institutions and agents that constitute the new democratic political system have not, as yet, been fully and unconditionally legitimated by the entire population. The six months under review revealed no significant change in this regard.

⁴¹ Gibson, J. L. (2002) ‘Empirical Indicators of Reconciliation’. Unpublished document.

⁴² Huyse, L. (2003) ‘The Process of Reconciliation’ in Bloomfield, D, Barnes, T and L. Huyse (eds) (2003) *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Sweden. Pp. 21.

9. Cross-cutting Political Relationships

Speaking about South Africa's odds for a successful consolidation of democracy, Giliomee and Schlemmer identify the need for cross-cutting cleavages.⁴³ They argue that social divisions that cut across one another, rather than being superimposed on one another are more conducive to the consolidation process. Although cross-cutting divisions are also important for reconciliation, it is more that citizens are able to form political groupings that stretch across racial, religious, class and linguistic boundaries.⁴⁴ Various referred to as political tolerance or political integration, this involves citizens seeking larger political groupings that transcend existing societal boundaries, as a basis for cooperation and collaboration in order to attain the minimal preconditions for political reconciliation. Only with this kind of willingness and commitment to form new political relationships, can key challenges to reconciliation be faced.

Of course no study of reconciliation would be complete without extensive research into the field of political tolerance. In their latest book *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa*, Gibson and Gouws contend that political tolerance, whilst being a paramount component of a democratic political culture in many countries, may be the most decisive component of South Africa's political culture as it seeks to consolidate its democracy and reconcile its nation. They go on to describe tolerance as 'the willingness to allow all groups, irrespective of their political viewpoints, to compete for political power through legal and peaceful means, and relying upon a research tradition well established within relatively democratic polities'.⁴⁵

This research paper fully acknowledges the salience of political tolerance in any post-conflict society, and in particular, present-day South Africa. The wealth of public opinion research that has been conducted about political intolerance in the South African context, most notably by Gibson and Gouws,⁴⁶ compared to the relative vacuum of public opinion research on other components of reconciliation, led to the decision not to duplicate existing ongoing tolerance research, but to utilize the limited resources available to examine other facets of the reconciliation process. One such facet is the capacity of members of the population to conceive of belonging to political communities that are shared or even dominated by South Africans of other racial backgrounds.

9.1. National Unity

It can be hypothesized that, at minimum, there should be a degree of commitment by South Africans, to the creation of one nation from all the population's subgroups.


⁴³ Giliomee, H and Schlemmer, L. (1994) 'Overview: Can a South African Democracy become Consolidated?' in Giliomee, H. (ed) *The Bold Experiment*. Johannesburg: Southern. Pp. 181.

⁴⁴ Villa-Vicencio, C. (2003) 'The Politics of Reconciliation.' Unpublished paper; Chapman, A.R. (2002) 'Approaches to Studying Reconciliation'. Paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions. Stellenbosch, South Africa. November 2002. Pg. 15.

⁴⁵ Gibson, J.L and Gouws, A. (2003) *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁶ For an excellent analysis see Gibson, J.L and Gouws, A. (2003) *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also see Gibson, J.L and Gouws, A. (2000) 'Social Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages within the South African Mass Public' in *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 44. No. 2. Pp 278 –292; Gouws, A (1996) 'Political Tolerance and Civil Society: The Case Study of South Africa' in *Politikon*. Vol. 20. Iss. 1. Pp. 15 – 31.

Graph 13: Perceived desirability of creating one nation (by race).



Question asked: *It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country.* (Percentage in Agreement).

The data reports a positive fluctuation, with 10% more South Africans in November 2003 saying it is desirable to create one nation out of all the groups that live in the country than was the case in April 2003. Racial disaggregation reveals a 10% increase amongst Whites and a 9% increase amongst both black and Indian South Africans, with only Coloureds not revealing a significant positive upswing. At the same time, it is important not to overlook distinct racial differences, with between 80 and 90% of all Coloureds, Indians and Blacks supporting unification, compared to between 60 and 70% of Whites.

On the whole, this upswing in support for one united South Africa needs closer examination. The period between the surveys does not appear to be characterized by any particularly prominent symbolic events, situations or trends that could account for this surge in subjective goodwill for greater unification. The figures from the next round of the survey will have to be closely examined to verify whether this surge marks the starting of any significant trend, or whether it was simply a fleeting and unexplainable blip in South African public opinion.

9.2. Racially mixed Political Parties


At a more demanding level, Chapman speaks about the need to create “new forms of social institutions and political parties with a multi-community basis”.⁴⁷ A great deal of South Africa’s public debate before the recent national elections focused not on the possible outcome of the election (no one seriously doubted that the ANC would win a landslide victory), but on whether the outcome would reveal an increase or decrease in racial voting patterns. This is not a new question in South African politics and has stirred

⁴⁷ Chapman, A.R. (2002) “Approaches to Studying Reconciliation”. Paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions. Stellenbosch, South Africa. November 2002. Pg. 5.

considerable popular and academic debate,⁴⁸ with a growing body of literature asserting that, particularly in the 1999 elections, the outcome was certainly not simply the result of a racial or ethnic census.⁴⁹

Rather than focusing on the question of whether national election outcomes represent a racial or ethnic census, - a research question has been the source of a great deal of thoroughgoing empirical analysis, the *SA Reconciliation Barometer* seeks to determine whether South Africans find the idea of multiracial political parties undesirable.

Graph 14: Perceived inability of belonging to multiracial political parties (by race).



Question asked: *I could never imagine being part of a political party made up mainly of people of another race.*⁵⁰ (Percentage in Agreement)

The November round of data reported that approximately 45% of South Africans agree that they could not even imagine belonging to a political party dominated by another race, and this portion is by no means lower than was the case in April 2003. The only significant shift over time occurred amongst coloured respondents, where 11% more found multiracial political parties unacceptable. It may be possible that some of this sentiment stems from the view that no political parties are really seen as representing the ‘coloured vote’. Despite the fact that most major political parties officially proclaim following a

⁴⁸ For some examples see Du Toit, P (1999) ‘The South Africans voter and the racial census’ in *Politeia*. Vol. 18, No. 2.; Lodge, T. (1994) ‘The South African General Election, April 1994: results, analysis and implications’ in *African Affairs*. Vol. 94.; Southall, R (1994) ‘The South African elections of 1994: the remaking of a dominant-party state’ in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 32. Iss. 4.; Mattes, R.; Giliomee, H and James, W. (1996) ‘The elections in the Western Cape’ in Johnston, R.W. and Schlemmer, L. (eds) (1996) *Launching Democracy in South Africa. The first Open Election, April 1994*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

⁴⁹ Mattes, R., Taylor, H. and Africa, C. (1999) ‘Judgement and Choice in the 1999 South Africans election’ in *Politikon*. Vol. 26. No. 2.; Friedman, S (1999) ‘Who we are: voter participation, rationality and the 1999 elections’ in *Politikon*. Vol. 26. No. 2.; Taylor, R and Hoene, T.. (1999) ‘Interpreting the South African election of June 1999’ in *Politikon*. Vol. 26. No. 2

⁵⁰ Based on the respondent’s own race, the question was asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups

non-racial vision, most are seen “to be articulating the interests of particular racial or ethnic groups.”⁵¹

This was certainly the case in 1999 when 85% of Whites, 88% of Coloureds and 100% of Indians identified the African National Congress (ANC) as an ‘African’ party, whilst most Africans thought the Democratic Alliance (DA) and New National Party (NNP) was an exclusively white party.⁵² Although coloured South Africans did not see the NNP and DA as exclusively ‘white parties’ at the time, it is possible that this perception has grown since the survey was conducted in 1999. This view could have been amplified by the alliance that the NNP, 41,7% of whose vote a September 2003 Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) poll predicted as stemming from the coloured community,⁵³ struck with the ANC. These changes may have brought about heightened disillusionment amongst the coloured electorate, in terms of “non-racial” political parties not truly seeing to the interests and needs of their coloured voters if dominated by another race group.

This also serves to emphasize the difficulty numerous political parties, but in particular the largely white supported DA and the mostly black supported ANC,⁵⁴ faced in attempting to draw voters outside their usual voter socio-demographic profile in the run up to the election. The fact that more black voters than any other population group found belonging to a political party dominated by another race unacceptable points to the even greater difficulty faced by any party that is perceived as being a “White” party, but strives to represent a powerful opposition to the party in power. The scenario painted by this data seems to have played itself out by the fact that the DA’s director of strategy Ryan Coetzee himself admitted “we didn’t get as many black votes as we wanted”.⁵⁵

The next round of the national survey, undertaken shortly after the elections, will be closely analysed to investigate whether the idea of minority racial clusters in political parties are more acceptable to South Africans, as well as for any evidence that the attempts of political parties to “move away from the narrow style and tone of past electoral campaigns, which were often characterised by racial undertones and group references for political purposes”⁵⁶ is having any effect.

10. Dialogue

Doxtader argues that reconciliation requires more than a superficial willingness to belong to a diverse political constituency, it requires dialogue, or what Kahane refers to as “deep conversations”.⁵⁷ Doxtader argues that it extends beyond discussion, beyond individuals and groups gathering and “expressing their views, and then leaving their respective claims to hang in the air like so much smoke”.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Habib, A. (2004) “Are South Africa’s elections a racial census?” in *Election Synopsis*. Vol. 1. Iss. 2. Pp. 6.

⁵² Party Support in South Africa’s third democratic election (2004) Election Brief. The Political Information and Monitoring Service – South Africa. Idasa.

⁵³ Rule, S (2004) “Motivations behind voting behaviour in South Africa” in *Election Synopsis*. Vol. 1. Iss. 2. Pp. 9.

⁵⁴ *Business Day*, 21 April 2004.

⁵⁵ *Business Day*, 21 April 2004.

⁵⁶ Party Support in South Africa’s third democratic election (2004) Election Brief. The Political Information and Monitoring Service – South Africa. Idasa.


⁵⁷ Kahane, A (2002) *Shaping the Future: How Small Groups of People Can Change the World for the Better*. Unpublished Manuscript.

⁵⁸ Doxtader, E. (2001) “Debate about Debate will Build Democracy” in *Cape Times*. 13 May 2001.

Quantifying the extent to which this kind of meaningful dialogue is occurring, is virtually impossible. Instead the survey instrument included two items that allowed for an evaluation of the willingness of people to speak with people of other racial, cultural, religious or language backgrounds about reconciliation or any of the range of complex and often conflicting issues involved in the larger reconciliation process. At the same time the items make reference to two important institutions or stakeholders that have the capacity to facilitate this kind of dialogue. Consequently the questions may also provide some measure of the extent to which South Africans would like these institutions to play a more active role in encouraging this kind of debate.

Although the function and role of the media in present day South Africa has been hotly debated, besides fulfilling its responsibility of providing mass audiences with knowledge and information, the media can feasibly also play a role in bringing South Africans into dialogue, whether it be through current affairs programmes, the letter, editorial and opinion piece pages of newspapers or the broadcasting of public debates. As a result, a question concerning greater efforts by the media to facilitate open debate about issues pertinent to the reconciliation process was included in the survey.


Graph 15: Support for greater media facilitated dialogue (by race).



Question asked: *The government should require Radio and TV stations to have more shows where South Africans can talk to each other about things like transformation and nation-building* (Percentage in Agreement).

Almost a quarter of all South Africans asserted they want the media to play a more proactive role in furthering public dialogue. Moreover, public support has remained constant across all race groups, although support amongst Whites remains substantially lower than amongst any other group. This reluctance of Whites to engage in more dialogue and get to know other South Africans better is also visible in the data on inter-faith services, which reveals that 43% of Whites are in support, compared to double the portion of Coloureds (86%) and Indians (86%), with Blacks in between at 76%. Once again, there has been significant change in opinion over time.

Graph 16: Support for greater faith community facilitated dialogue (by race).



Question asked: *Different churches or religious organizations should start holding some services together so that different South Africans can get to know one another better* (Percentage in Agreement).

Political analyst and veteran journalist Max Du Preez remarked recently that strategically speaking government laws alone do not have the capacity to make the problems of ‘moral decay, loss of human dignity, crime and racial and ethnic divisions’ go away. He asserted that these issues should be addressed by trade unions, charity organizations, cultural societies and other clubs, ‘but by their nature, faith communities are best placed to address these ills in our society. They should be more proactive; and they should be cooperating much more’.⁵⁹ In a similar vein, but on the basis of moral grounds, former Bishop of the Methodist Church Peter Storey argued that ‘the religious component of civil society bears a great burden of responsibility for South Africa’s past and needs to shoulder a significant part of the task of reconciliation for the future’.⁶⁰

On the whole, South Africans reveal relatively high levels of support for both religious and media organisations to play a more proactive role in providing South Africans with the space and opportunity to get to know one another, thereby contributing towards bridging the divides between South Africans of different backgrounds.

Whilst certain sectors of the greater population are less enthusiastic about the idea, the data points to a clear opportunity for various stakeholders to become involved, and in doing so, advance reconciliation. A lack of commitment to dialogue does not appear to be an obstacle to reconciliation, while the opportunity to engage in dialogue and the knowledge of how to go about it may well be considered as such.

⁵⁹ *The Star*, 1 May 2003.

⁶⁰ Storey, P. (1994) ‘Reconciliation and Civil Society’. Paper presented at the *Making Ends Meet: Reconciliation and Reconstruction in South Africa Conference*. World Trade Centre: Johannesburg. 18 August 1994.


11. Historical Confrontation

No discussion of the reconciliation process in South Africa or any other transitional society would be complete without an investigation of the degree to which the nation has been able to confront its past. There is a saying that proclaims that ‘those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it’. Whilst this certainly rings true, a nation unable to let go of its history also faces the danger of never reconciling. A thorough confrontation of the past appears to be the safest route to follow.

11.1. Acknowledgement

Amongst others Villa-Vicencio emphasizes acknowledgement as a critical milestone along this path.⁶¹ In South Africa, as in most transitional societies, acknowledgment of the past, extending often to the acknowledgment of the past’s continued impact on present, is critical. Many of today’s social ills, be they excessive violence, high levels of inequality or advanced social dislocation, are strongly rooted in the specific historical context of the country pre-1994.⁶²

Graph 17: Acknowledgement of present income differences being rooted in past educational opportunity differences (by race).



Question asked: *South Africa has great income differences today because in the past Blacks were not given the same education opportunities as Whites.* (Percentage in Agreement)

In response to the statement that South Africa has great income differences today because in the past Blacks were not given the same educational opportunities as Whites,

⁶¹ Villa-Vicencio, C (2003) *The Politics of Reconciliation*. Unpublished paper. See also Biko, N. (1998) “Amnesty and Denial” in Villa -Vicencio, C and Verwoerd, W. (eds) (2000) *Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*. University of Cape Town Press: Cape Town. Pp.196.

⁶² Gerwel, J (2000) *Combating Racism: A nation in Dialogue*. Keynote address at the National Anti-Racism Conference. Sandton, Johannesburg. 30 August 2000.


82% of the population deemed this true. It can be hypothesized that as time passes and more matriculants leave the primary and secondary education sector without having been subjected to Bantu education, the portion of South Africans holding this view would lessen. Over the course of last year no decrease was yet visible.

A racial breakdown reveals interesting differences: whilst 86% of Blacks, 90% of Coloureds and 76% of Indians agree, only 59% of Whites agree. This lower level of agreement amongst Whites suggests that a substantial portion of Whites still need to realize and recognize that many problems today are the result of the past. This is problematic as acknowledgement is a very important step, in that it ‘forms a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for outcomes such as democratization and judicial reform, reconciliation, and the growth of social trust... The process of acknowledgment, if it assists in overcoming the causes of conflict, has the potential to support real and lasting change.’⁶³

11.2 Forgetting the past

It would seem that whilst there certainly is need for acknowledgement, recognition, remembering and healing, there is certainly also a need for South Africans to channel their energies into creating a nation that is peaceful, productive and forward-looking. As Alwinus Mhlatsi, appearing before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) argued: ‘We have children to bring up’. It would appear that, provided people have sufficiently addressed the demons of this country’s past, a willingness to move forward and improve the country and their own place within it, can only be beneficial for the reconciliation process.

Graph 18: Perceived desirability of forgetting about the past and moving on (by race).



Question asked: *I want to forget about the past and just get on with my life* (Percentage in Agreement)

⁶³ Quinn, J (2003) Acknowledgement: The Road to Forgiveness. Institute on Globalization and the Human Conditions Institute Working Paper Series GHC 03/1. January 2003.


In November 2003 eight out of ten South Africans expressed a desire to simply move on. The lapsed time between the two surveys did not show any significant changes in opinion. Interestingly this is one of the only questions that once disaggregated by race reveals very little difference in views between black and white South Africans.

Substantial will to confront the future instead of remaining confined in the past does exist. The question that beckons answering is whether any sizeable portions of those willing to move on, may actually feel that they are unable to do so for a variety of reasons, ranging from unhealed memories, historically-rooted structural disadvantages or suffocating levels of poverty.

11.3 Forgiving the past

The survey instrument also included a question intended to provide some insight into the state of readiness of South Africans to forgive. Taking into account the fact that apartheid did not affect all South Africans in the same way, the option of ‘not applicable’ was also included. There was no significant difference in the portion of citizens claiming the question was not applicable.

Graph 19: Perceived attempts at forgiving for the past (by race).



Question asked: *I am trying to forgive those who hurt me during apartheid* (Percentage in Agreement)

Only 5% of South Africans said they were not trying to forgive those who hurt them during apartheid, with 2% of Coloured and 6% of Blacks and Indians respectively stating this to be the case. This suggests that despite the sometimes-voiced view that post-apartheid lives at a grassroots level have not improved, there seems very little resentment, and in fact, considerable good will to forgive and move on.

11.4. Vengeance

A great deal of debate has emerged over the question of the necessity of forgiveness in post-conflict societies. Increasingly scholars are examining perpetrator-

victim relations from the opposite vantage point, focusing on the necessity of reducing levels of need for vengeance. Proponents of this view argue that vengeance or revenge represents the flipside of forgiveness, and occurs as a moral response to loss or wrongs based on the impulse to retaliate.⁶⁴

O'Malley, commenting on eleven workshops conducted with Khulumani Support group members, speaks about vengeance as the 'pacts' people make as a response to excessive loss.⁶⁵ He argues "these pacts may take the form of a vow to avenge the death, or a vow that nothing else will ever replace the deceased".⁶⁶ Accordingly this seeking of revenge or vengeance will manifest itself if opportunities for venting and confronting the emotions evoked by the loss are not established. Similarly Jacoby asserts "vengeful anger is at its most powerful and pervasive when there are no mechanisms for releasing it through legitimate channels".⁶⁷

Hartwell has expanded upon this notion of vengeance as the reverse of forgiveness by adding a third dimension, which she refers to as 'passive resentment'. She describes this as "a neutral but volatile middle ground between forgiveness and revenge", at which people feel the need for vengeance, but do not generally act upon this impulse. If any individuals act on this need for vengeance, the majority will generally not approve of these acts, as most people falling into this category are likely to wait and see whether the new system will bring them justice.⁶⁸

The dangers of high levels of vengeance are clear. If unchecked, the response of victims may lapse into acts of aggression and violence. Besides the blatantly illegal nature of such acts, there is also an inherent danger that the retaliatory acts will be disproportionate to the wrongs committed, or may simply be waged against innocent "others whom they identify with perpetrators".⁶⁹ Moreover, when people seek to avenge the crimes perpetrated against themselves, there is potential for a situation whereby "the fantasy of revenge simply reverses the role of the perpetrator and victim, continuing to imprison the victim in horror and degradation".⁷⁰ Even the presence of high levels of 'passive resentment', if not constantly checked, have the potential to evolve into high levels of the need for vengeance. The result of this can be self-perpetuating circles of the victor's revenge that continue the conflict indefinitely.

From the table it is clear that slightly more than 40% of the general population is in support of some form of reciprocal discrimination for those responsible for discrimination, indicating the presence of substantial levels of passive resentment.

⁶⁴ Marcia Hartwell. Interview: Cape Town, December 2002.

⁶⁵ O'Malley, G (1999) "Respecting Revenge: The Road to Reconciliation" in *Law, Democracy and Development*. Vol. 3.

⁶⁶ Quoting Hamber, B. and R. Wilson (1999) "Symbolic Closure through memory, reparation and revenge in post-conflict societies." Paper presented at the Traumatic Stress in South Africa Conference hosted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in association with the African Society for Traumatic Stress Studies. Johannesburg: Parktonian Hotel. 27 – 29 January 1999.


⁶⁷ Jacoby, S (1983) *Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge*. New York: Harper & Row. Pp. 181.

⁶⁸ Interview: Cape Town, December 2002.

⁶⁹ O'Malley, G (1999) "Respecting Revenge: The Road to Reconciliation" in *Law, Democracy and Development*. Vol. 3.

⁷⁰ Minow, M (1998) *Between vengeance and forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence*. Boston: Beacon Press. Pp. 13.


Graph 20: Perceived fairness of reciprocal discrimination (by race).



Question asked: *I think it is fair that the people who discriminated against others during apartheid feel what it is like to be discriminated against.*(Percentage in Agreement)

As may have been expected, with Whites generally being beneficiaries and Blacks the victims of discriminatory practices, only 15% of Whites compared to a far larger portion of 47% of black South Africans agreed with the statement. It is noteworthy that levels of passive resentment amongst black South Africans dropped by 9% and that amongst Indians plunged by a massive 20%.

Graph 21: Perceived lack of right to publicise apartheid perpetrator names (by race).




Question asked: *People who suffered during apartheid have no right to make public the names and abusive actions of those responsible.* (Percentage in Agreement).

On the question of publicly naming apartheid era perpetrators, four out of ten South Africans agreed in November 2003, that victims had no such right. Although this portion was not significantly higher than in April of that year, the portion of indian South Africans in agreement that victims had no such rights increased by 9% and that amongst coloured and white South Africans by 8% respectively.

The third question, intended to measure more overt needs for vengeance, elicited very similar results. A third of all South Africans agreed that those responsible for apartheid should be punished, regardless of whether this decision was supported by a court of law, representing a drop of 8% since the April survey. This decrease was evident amongst black respondents (9%) and indian respondents (8%).

Graph 22: Perceived appropriateness of extra-legal perpetrator punishment (by race).



Question asked: *People who abused others during apartheid must be punished, even if it means going against the decisions of the courts.* (Percentage in Agreement)

Over the course of last year all three questions reported a decline in public levels of passive resentment and desire to take vengeance. Should this fluctuation pan out into a fully-fledged trend of decreased need for some form of revenge, this will be beneficial to the reconciliation process. This seems to be indicative of a growing sense of allowing that part of South Africa’s history to be laid to rest. This notion may have been augmented by the fact that the final outstanding chapters of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report were handed over in March 2003, and that the final decisions on the question of reparations was concluded by Parliament shortly afterwards.

The thus far positive finding needs to be monitored very closely, particularly in light of recent developments. Of particular importance is the recent arrest of Gideon Niewoudt, former security police colonel, and two of his fellow accomplices. The arrest, made in early 2004, was followed by a successful application with the Cape High Court to set aside the decision of the sub-Committee on Amnesty to deny them amnesty, and the re-opening of the TRC Amnesty Committee to hear their case. Whether these attempts to

fully investigate and, if necessary, prosecute Niewoudt, who is not only being charged with the murder of the “Pebco Three”, but was also present at the interrogation of Black Consciousness leader Steve Bantu Biko and was linked to the killing of the “Cradock Four”, another group of Eastern Cape civic activists, as well as his very prominent attempts to challenge any such action, have the potential to re-incite people’s wishes to seek vengeance against apartheid perpetrators remains to be seen.

12. Racial Reconciliation

A number of proponents of political reconciliation challenge the importance of any inter-group relations measures, asserting, for example, that “relatively negative attitudes toward members of other groups and a reluctance to engage in intimate social relationships may not have direct implications for national reconciliation”⁷¹. They argue that the presence of adequate normative and legislative parameters, together with a politically tolerant and generally respectful citizenry is sufficient for national reconciliation.

This paper, whilst recognizing that previously divided parties do not need to “love each other” to live together, will argue that social distance, stereo-type and social contact indicators are important for national reconciliation. Low levels of social trust and understanding, based largely on stereotypical views of others, infringe drastically on people’s capacity to build workable relationships, which in turn are critical for rebuilding those structural social institutions that form the basis of a democratic society.

In both separate national surveys conducted six months apart, South Africans most frequently cited the wealth gap as the biggest division in the country. Despite this empirical finding, the bulk of the survey’s inter-group relations measures refer exclusively to inter-racial reconciliation. Not only does this run contrary to the survey’s findings of the primary divisions, but it appears to ignore the harsh socio-economic inequality prevalent in the country today.

A growing body of economic research, most recently expanded upon by Whiteford and Van Seventer,⁷² and Seekings and Natrass,⁷³ has demonstrated that the share of wealth held by white South Africans has deteriorated (albeit from a very high base), whilst the share of income held by Blacks increased from the 1970s onwards (from an exceptionally low base). These and a number of other changes have resulted in a situation where the income difference within each racial group has grown, whilst the income gap between the race groups has narrowed. One demonstration of the result of these changes is

⁷¹ Chapman, A.R. (2002) “Approaches to Studying Reconciliation”. Paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions. Stellenbosch, South Africa. November 2002. Pg. 9.

⁷² See Whiteford, A. & Van Seventer, D. (2000) Understanding contemporary Household Inequality in South Africa” in *Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics*. Vol. 24, Iss. 3. Pp. 7 –30; Whiteford, A. (1996) “Economic and Human Development” in *A Socio-Economic Atlas of South Africa: A demographic, Socio-economic and Cultural Profile of South Africa*. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers.

⁷³ See Natrass, N. (2003) “The State of the Economy: A Crisis of Employment” in Daniel, J; Habib, A and R. Southall (eds) (2003) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003 – 2004*. Cape Town: HSRC Press; Natrass, N and J. Seekings (2001) “Race and Economic Inequality in South Africa” in *Daedalus*. Winter 2001. Pp. 45-72.

the fact that black households now account for 22% of the wealthiest 10% of all South African households.⁷⁴

Social analysts have monitored this trend and responded accordingly, arguing that “the emergence of a new middle class among communities previously disadvantaged by apartheid, make the crude use of race less accurate in gauging the different needs of South Africans”⁷⁵. The once overlapping lines of race and income have begun shifting.

These shifts have, however, been restricted. Without undermining the benefits of a wider welfare net on the quality of life of the poor, the racial composition of the country’s poor has remained largely black and the majority of the country’s black citizens have remained poor. For the majority the lines of income and race have not blurred, with the result that both still represent real division in need of reconciliation.

In some societies class divisions extend far beyond a measure of an individual’s financial status. In such status conscious societies, class lines still generally separate people with different lifestyles, cultures, norms, attitudes and values. Although the situation is undoubtedly changing, in South Africa at present, this research will rest on the assumption that race, rather than class, still demarcates such divisions.

Thus, not only have class lines only really changed at the apex of the country’s socio-economic pyramid (leaving the base relatively unchanged), but it would seem that the subjective value, norm and attitude changes that presumably accompany class changes are lagging behind the actual economic shift. As a result, the *SA Reconciliation Barometer* survey instrument focused largely on race-relations measures. This decision was also partially based on findings of the exploratory *SA Reconciliation Barometer* survey, which yielded evidence that for a substantial portion of South Africans reconciliation is still understood in a racial context.⁷⁶

12.1. Cross-racial Interaction

Although, as Gibson notes, there is no conclusive verdict on whether interracial contact enhances racial harmony, it does seem likely “that contact, particularly close and sustained contact, with members of different cultural groups promotes positive, tolerant attitudes. By contrast, the absence of such contact is believed to foster stereotyping, prejudice and ill will towards these groups”.⁷⁷

On the basis of this assumption, the survey instrument included a number of items to determine the extent and depth of inter-racial contact across racial groups, as well as the desire (or lack thereof) to increase this contact. Graph 23 portrays the extent of inter-racial contact reported by South Africans as a whole. Thirty five percent of respondents in the

⁷⁴ Whiteford, A. & Van Seventer, D. (2000) Understanding contemporary Household Inequality in South Africa” in *Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics*. Vol. 24, Iss. 3. Pp. 7 –30.


⁷⁵ Rule, S (ed) (1999) *Public Opinion on National Priority Issues Election '99*. Democracy SA. Human Sciences Research Council. HSRC Publishers. Pp. 26.

⁷⁶ The need to reconcile South Africans divided by class, religion, language and a host of other division should not be underestimated, and with the accrual of additional funds measures to assess the state of relations across other divisions will be added to the research instrument.

⁷⁷ Ellison, C and D.A. Powers (1994) “The Contact Hypothesis and Racial Attitudes amongst Black Americans” in *Social Science Quarterly*. Vol. 75, Iss. 2. quoted in Gibson, J (2002) “Measuring Racial Reconciliation through Inter-racial respect and Understanding”. Unpublished Paper.

November round asserted they never have contact with a member of another racial group on an average day in the week, a portion that is 9% higher than the April figure. Racial disaggregation of the data reveals that this significant increase in the number of South Africans who never have cross-racial contact is most prominent amongst the black group.

Graph 23: Reported frequency of a lack of involuntary cross-racial contact (by race).



Question asked: *On a typical day during the week, whether at work or otherwise, how often do you talk to people of another race?*⁷⁸ (Percentage who answered NEVER).

It is likely that a small portion of this reduction in already low levels of contact could stem from fluctuations in employment levels, whereby an increase would mean that people no longer have employment based inter-racial contact. This could only account for a very small portion of the answers and other factors should be considered. It is likely that the data implies that people are changing the places they go to. This could mean that as the shopping and other facilities in townships expand, so there may no longer be the need for people to go to the cities for such everyday activities, thereby reducing opportunities for cross-racial contact.


Alternatively, we could be witnessing a new brand of ‘group areas’ residential distribution. This would entail that although all residential areas are now legally open to all South Africans, as black South Africans move into certain suburbs, the present inhabitants of these previously ‘white’, ‘coloured’ or ‘indian’ suburbs move out. It is unlikely that this is happening on a large scale. Therefore this increase in the portion of Blacks who report never experiencing cross-racial interaction is somewhat confounding, and consequent survey results will have to be closely monitored.

Breaking down the data by race reveals that Whites, Coloureds and Indians report more frequent interaction with members of other races on any given weekday than black South Africans. This is hardly surprising in light of the fact that the great majority of the

⁷⁸ Based on the respondent’s own race, the question was asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups

South African population is black and that it is more likely for members of the white, coloured and Indian minority groups to make contact with Blacks, than it is for the mass of black South Africans to make contact with the comparatively much smaller groups of Indians, Coloureds and Whites. Additionally, many black South Africans spend their days in the country's townships, which are very rarely visited by white, coloured and Indian South Africans and are therefore subject to a certain degree of involuntary racial isolation.

Graph 24: Reported frequency of a lack of intentional cross-racial contact (by race).



Question asked: *When socializing in your own home or the homes of friends, how often do you talk to People of another race?*⁷⁹ (Percentage who answered NEVER).

Despite having enjoyed almost a decade of no legally enshrined racial segregation, and despite many politically correct protestations about friendships across colour lines, 56% of respondents reported never engaging in any close, voluntary social contact with citizens from other racial backgrounds. Again there had been significant increase of 10% over the course of last year. This increase in the portion who never have cross-racial social contact is possibly even more confounding than in the case of involuntary contact.

Not only does the data reveal an upsurge over the lapse period between the two rounds of the survey, but the disjuncture between involuntary contact, as experienced by people in their everyday business, and the extent of voluntary, more intimate and certainly on a more equal- participant-basis contact, is very clear.


In conjunction these findings bear testimony to the long path to meaningful integration that still lies ahead for the nation. But the stage of social dislocation and segregation at which South Africa found itself at in 1994 should be borne in mind. Some analysts have reported on how difficult it is for many, especially older, South Africans to overcome the distrust and lack of understanding which characterized their interactions prior to 1994. Many have reacted to this rapid expansion in opportunities for racial

⁷⁹ Based on the respondent's own race, the question was asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups

interaction by creating racially homogenous ‘comfort zones’ to which to retreat to at night⁸⁰.

There was no overall significant change in the portion of South Africans saying they would welcome more contact with people of other races, and this sentiment was verbalized by about a third of all respondents.

Graph 25: Preferred frequency of cross-racial contact (by race).



Question asked: *If you had a choice, would you want to talk to people of another race group ...*⁸¹ (Percentage answered MORE OFTEN)

Certain intra-racial differences between the two rounds of the survey are, however, visible. Thirteen percent fewer coloured South Africans and 8% fewer Indians revealed a desire for more frequent contact in November 2003, compared to six months previously in the April round.

In addition there are significant cross-racial differences in the appeal for more contact. In November 2003 only 12% of Whites expressed a need for more frequent contact, compared to 54% of Coloureds, with Blacks and Indians in between. On the other end of the scale the opposite is true. Eighteen percent of black South Africans compared to 7% of Whites and 3% of Coloureds and Indians wanted less frequent contact. There could be a number of reasons for this. The extent of black isolation mentioned previously could be responsible for the perpetuation of negative racial stereotypes and misconceptions, which could lead to this unwillingness of Blacks to encounter Whites more frequently. Alternatively, the nature of uneven and disrespectful cross-racial contact under apartheid, could also explain this hesitance.

⁸⁰ Du Toit, F (ed)(2003) Learning to Live Together: Practices of Social Reconciliation. Rondebosch: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Pp 89.


⁸¹ Based on the respondent's own race, the question was asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

This data reveals that there is no homogeneity of opinion on the extent of cross-racial interaction, particularly in the Black group. Whilst four in every ten want more contact, two in every ten Blacks desire less, but neither of these figures have changed significantly over the period under review. This suggests that the increases amongst black South Africans, who never have interactions across racial lines, either inadvertently or in social situations, are unlikely to be voluntary, and more likely to be the result of a lack of opportunity.

12.2. Cross-racial Perceptions

The table reports that more than 60% of South Africans agree that they find it difficult to understand South Africans of other races. A lack of understanding is problematic both as a deterrent to meaningful interaction and as a result of a lack of interaction. It appears as if black South Africans are affected most by a difficulty in accepting the customs and ways of other racial groups. This could largely be attributed to the greater extent of social isolation experienced by black South Africans, though other possible reasons should be explored.

Graph 26: Perceived difficulty in cross-racial understanding (by race).




Question asked: *I find it difficult to understand the customs and ways of people of another race*⁸²
(Percentage in Agreement).

Compared to the almost two thirds of respondents claiming to have trouble understanding people of other races, substantially fewer South Africans report having trouble trusting people of other race groups. This measure of cross-racial perceptions also remains relatively static over time, with only Whites revealing a significant upsurge in inter-racial distrust of 8%.

⁸² Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

Proponents of political reconciliation regularly stress the fact that ‘the absence of social interactions does not necessarily inhibit collaboration in civil society and political institutions that cut across community boundaries’.⁸³ However, reports from practitioners on the ground constantly emphasize the importance of ‘broadening the thin lines of trust’ as a mandatory pre-condition to creating workable relationships.

Graph 27: Perceived difficulty in cross-racial trust (by race).



Question asked: *People of another race are untrustworthy*⁸⁴ (Percentage in Agreement)

Whilst it may not be important for previously conflicting parties to share close social relationships, a certain critical measure of trust is essential for the creation of any workable partnership. In the South African context, most of the relationships necessary to facilitate development, transformation and reconciliation require South Africans to trust one another. A closer examination of the data reveals higher levels of distrust amongst Blacks than amongst Whites, Indians and Coloureds. Considering the fact that under apartheid black South Africans suffered the most severe abuse and oppression, it is not completely unexpected that these groups reveal the highest levels of distrust.

12.3. Cross-racial Social Distance


Other than measures intended to tap into respondent’s general attitudes towards members of other races, the survey instrument also used some social distance indicators that are based on existing scales used in the US and elsewhere.⁸⁵ Racially diverse, if not meaningfully integrated, schools do not present a problem for the majority of South Africans, approximately sixty percent of whom approve. This sentiment has remained stable over the period under review.

⁸³ Chapman, A.R. (2002) ‘Approaches to Studying Reconciliation’. Paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions. Stellenbosch, South Africa. November 2002. Pp. 9.

⁸⁴ Based on the respondent’s own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

⁸⁵ These measures are an adaptation of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, which is a set of measures that indicate the degree to which a person is willing to associate with a class or type of people.


Graph 28: Approval of direct cross-racial contact at schools (by race).



Question asked: *Having a person of another race sitting next to my child, or the child of a friend, at school*⁸⁶
(Percentage who approved)

Distinct racial differences are, however, evident, with similarly high levels of support for mixed schools amongst Coloureds and Indians and significantly lower approval levels amongst the other two groups, with less than half of all Whites approving.

Graph 29: Approval of cross-racial neighbourhoods (by race).



Question asked: *Living in a neighbourhood where half my neighbours are people of another race.*⁸⁷
(Percentage who approved).

⁸⁶ Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

South Africans do appear slightly more tolerant of racial integration in the classroom than they do in their neighbourhoods. Whilst about six in every ten South Africans approve of the former, only five in every ten approve of the latter, and little change has been witnessed in either over the period under review.

A similar pattern of slightly lower levels of approval amongst Blacks and even more so amongst Whites than Coloureds and Indians, is apparent in the data on integrated suburbs. Hence, the high level of commitment to nation-building discussed in a previous section does not appear to have been totally translated to the concrete level of racially diverse suburbs.

Realistically speaking, a scenario of half the population, including 36% of Whites, proclaiming support for racially integrated suburbs is hard to imagine in the early nineties. The massive mind-shift that has happened since the days in which South Africa's residential patterns were dictated by the Group Areas Act is substantial. Be that as it may, the data still point to a large portion of the population appears, however, to retain negative stereo-typical preconceptions about people of other races and, for now, show little inclination to change.

13. The State of Reconciliation

The first ten years of South Africa's democracy brought dramatic and rapid change. The nation's reconciliation process has made significant advances since the first democratic elections on the 27th November 1994.

But has the past decade brought about an increase in national commitment to the nation-building process? The answer, in theory at least, is a resounding yes. Over the course of last year there was a 10% increase to 83% in the portion of citizens wanting to see a united South Africa drawing in all the different groups who live in the country. Even though levels of support amongst Whites are still lower than amongst any of the other racial groups, there was an increase in commitment to national unity amongst black, white and indian South Africans.

This abstract dedication to reconciliation is also reflected in the high level of commitment to open and honest dialogue, whether it be facilitated by the media or any of a range of religious bodies. Support for talking about some of the complicated and difficult issues that divide South Africans into racial quarters is greatest amongst coloured and indian South Africans. The portion of Whites expressing such enthusiasm is about half that of any of the other groups.

South Africans, rather than viewing each other with overt hostility, appear to be expressing some willingness to peacefully and constructively resolve the issues that still divide the country. Rather than allowing divisions and tensions to erupt into overt conflict, the data point to a willingness to make things work. Whether this willingness is being translated in to constructive dialogue and action remains to be seen, but certainly it demands more action by various stakeholders.

⁸⁷ Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

It is true that the most exemplary legislative and institutional environment can fail to facilitate reconciliation, even in terms of the minimalist definition of peaceful existence, if it is not supported by such will, commitment and conviction to make things work. The salience of the high levels of commitment reported by the data should therefore not be underestimated.

Conversely, it is almost impossible to utilise this goodwill to feed the advancement of a culture of human rights and mutual respect without suitable legislative and institutional reforms. Among the most important political changes in post-1994 South Africa were the finalisation of a Constitution, complete with a Bill of Rights, the extension of universal suffrage and equal rights to all, the un-banning of political parties, as well as the creation of opportunities for civil society organisations and interest groups to become actively involved in mainstream political life. South Africans today enjoy a high level of freedom of movement, association and speech, have the option of a reasonably fair trial and are serviced by a relatively independent media. The third government of the day has just been elected through peaceful, free and fair elections.

An extension of the democratic franchise is not, however, sufficient to counter the widespread exclusion, discrimination or unmediated conflict that retards reconciliation. The creation of such a human rights culture requires more than a transformation of the political, institutional and legal structure, it demands a change in the political culture and values of that society. One of the corner stones of such a culture is a widely accepted belief in the inviolability of the rule of law.

About a third of all South Africans admit to choosing an extra-legal route to solving problems rather than waiting for a legal outcome, whilst about a quarter think they do not have to obey laws that were not made by the political party they support. This still indicates that the rule of law is not unequivocally respected, but may be disregarded if deemed unsuitable or not advantageous. This creates new opportunities for the violation of human rights and civil liberties, which not only hinders the process of democratic consolidation, but also impedes the creation of a thoroughgoing human rights culture, crucial for reconciliation.

Although it is encouraging that levels of disrespect for the rule of law have not risen in the period under review, this is certainly a dimension of reconciliation in which a great deal more work is necessary.

A facet of reconciliation that appears to be faring better is that of confronting South Africa's past. The data report relatively high levels of acknowledgement of the influence of the past on the present, particularly within the context of the impact of Bantu education on today's income inequality. Although the portion of Whites of this opinion was 20% smaller than in any of the other racial groups, a broad consensus on the issue appears to have developed. This recognition that income inequality is not the fault of specific individuals, but the result of systemic problems rooted in apartheid creates a much better platform from which to address these problems.

South Africans also reveal a remarkable willingness to forgive and forget, a combination that is likely to advance reconciliation. Eight out of ten South Africans want to forget about the past, and six out of ten South Africans want to forgive for what

happened to them. In both instances Coloureds and Indians were most willing to move forward, with the portion amongst Blacks only slightly lower.

In combination these sentiments create a valuable window of opportunity. A great deal of human, capital and emotional resources were expended on confronting the country's past, not least during the three years of the TRC's existence. This was a critical part of the first decade of reconciliation, and it is unlikely that South Africa would be where it finds itself today without such initiatives.

That being said, there is still a need to continue confronting the past on a local basis and at an almost individual level, whether it be in the form of memorialisation projects, story-telling sessions or community healing seminars.

But South African's national needs have changed. The country has both the opportunity and the obligation to embark on the next set of challenges. They are numerous and complex.

Among these challenges is the issue of South African's fears. South Africans feel threatened at a number of levels. The most prominent, and potentially destructive amongst these is crime. The impact of crime on the actual victim is just one facet of the problem. If there is a widely held view that the security and safety of the population or certain subsections thereof is under threat, levels of distrust, isolation and suspicion are bound to increase.

Fortunately the data does not reveal an increase in the perceived levels of physical threat. There was no real significant increase in the portion of South Africans who fear some attack on their personal or family's safety in the near future. On the whole between 40% and 45% of South Africans' expect some improvement in physical security. Although the portion of optimists in the population as a whole has not grown significantly, there was a distinct increase in optimism amongst the Indian population.

But significant cross-racial differences do exist. Whites and Indians were significantly more pessimistic about their expected future levels of safety than Coloureds. Black South Africans, on the other hand, were the most optimistic, with more than half expecting an improvement. This high level of fear amongst Whites, which is actually disproportionate to the probable level of threat Whites face, based on actual crime statistics, is particularly problematic for reconciliation.

South Africans are more optimistic about their economic security than their physical safety. The period under review revealed a 9% increase to 50% in the portion expecting some improvement in the general economic situation of the population. There has been a particularly significant increase in the levels of economic optimism amongst coloured South Africans. Once again there is a distinct cross-racial difference, with only three in ten Whites being optimistic, compared to five in ten Blacks.

On the question of cultural threats, there was no change over the course of last year. The most striking feature of this data is the massive difference in opinion between Whites and other groups on this issue, with the portion of Whites confident of an improvement being by far the lowest.

The data report that approximately half of all black South Africans are optimistic of an improvement in the physical, economic and cultural security. Roughly 35%, 55% and 45% respectively of Coloureds expect decreased physical, economic and cultural threats in the future. About 20% of Indians are optimistic about lower levels of physical threats. Approximately 45% and 37% respectively are optimistic of the economic and cultural situation. Only 10% of Whites expect an improvement in levels of physical threat, whilst 30% are economically optimistic and 18% culturally so.

The impact of these fears, and the comparatively greater fears amongst Whites, need to be monitored. A great deal of work to understand and hopefully dispel some of these fears is required. Physical security is the dimension of human security perceived by Whites, Coloureds and Indians as most under threat. These fears can result in greater wariness of interaction with other South Africans, which in turn encourages increased isolation from others. Anecdotal analysis suggests that this suspicion and distrust often happens on a racial basis, which in turn has repercussions for stereo-typing of others, and eventually on the state of racial reconciliation

The commitment to nation-building described previously is not exactly mirrored in the data on the state of racial reconciliation. Large sectors of South African society are continuing to live in almost complete isolation, experiencing South African multicultural society from the vantage point of their racially homogeneous squatter camps, exclusive suburbs, rural villages, gated security complexes and commercial farms.

Particularly concerning is the significant increase in the percentage of people who report never having cross-racial involuntary or more voluntary social contact. Thirty-five percent of the nation never has any inadvertent cross-racial interaction, whilst 55% never socialise with people of another race. Over the course of last year both of these measures reflected an almost 10% increase. This needs close monitoring, and if it should turn out that this is a national trend, this problem needs immediate and drastic action.

More encouragingly, 30% admit to wanting more frequent contact, and this is just as well as 60% of South Africans still struggle to understand people of other races. The data does not point to a decrease in this portion in the near future. Moreover, around 40% of South Africans find members of other races inherently untrustworthy.

Breaking down such barriers based on generalised preconceptions and hardened stereo-types take time. The two-thirds of the population that support integrated schools may be a good place to start. Schools can play an integral role in building understanding and trust. Although half of all South Africans also support integrated neighbourhoods, schools are by nature better suited to facilitate stereo-type reduction work. The success of schools in changing these somewhat disconcerting figures on cross-racial distrust and a lack of understanding will depend on how the curriculum addresses these issues, but also on the extent to which teachers create spaces for this to happen.

At present it would seem that political parties will have a more difficult time trying to bring about improved cross-racial trust and understanding. Four in ten South Africans say they could never even imagine belonging to a political party dominated by voters of a different race as their own.

Going back to the changed national needs at the start of the second decade of democracy. The advancement of reconciliation will depend on the capacity of the nation to meet the basic socio-economic rights of its disenfranchised and impoverished citizens.

The next ten years will unquestionably be the decade of a struggle for socio-economic rights. The success of the country's reconciliation process and the consolidation of its democracy will lie in the nation's ability to minimise the massive socio-economic gap that threatens to tear the country apart.

The survey revealed that South Africans themselves most frequently identify class as the biggest split the nation faces today. This is followed by racial discord, rifts based on HIV/Aids status and the division between political party supporters. This has not significantly changed in the period between the two surveys.

There are inter-racial differences in opinion. Whites view race and class as equally divisive, whilst HIV/Aids and politically based rifts are viewed as the most salient by approximately equal, though much smaller portions, of the white population.

Amongst Indians, class is considered the most important by far, with race and political party adherence featuring in a tied position in second place. The Indian population, as a whole, views the divisions caused by HIV/Aids infections as comparatively less important than these other divisions.

Coloureds most frequently identify the wealth gap as the biggest rift, with race, political party and HIV/Aids based- splits on similar levels. Over the course of last year there was a significant drop in the portion identifying divisions of a political nature, with a similarly significant increase in the importance of HIV/Aids based rifts. Amongst black South Africans class is the most frequently identified division, with race, HIV/Aids and political parties identified by roughly the same portion of people.

The point at which these largely physical divisions become subjective divisions, is where an entire range of new reconciliation processes need to emerge. Interpretation suggests that although South Africa is one of the most grossly unequal societies in the world, wealthy South Africa's do not yet appear to hold distinctly unique values, attitudes and beliefs from poor South Africans. It would appear that a division of the South African population into groups that hold similar values and perceptions would still run along racial, and to a lesser extent, class lines. This is unlikely to remain so for much longer.

The signs of change are already there. They are clear in the discrimination that HIV/Aids infected South Africans are subjected to, whether in their communities, at work or in schools. It is evident in the periodic violent outbursts between the IFP and ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. It is nascent in illegal land grabs that no longer have a dimension of race. The rumble of mass discontent amongst the hungry and destitute is growing louder.

Most political analysts forecast that there is little chance of a left-wing revolutionary upsurge in the near future. But, as Neville Alexander, commenting in his book *An Ordinary Country*, explains, there is 'a powerful, potentially explosive,

movement of the poor, led substantively, if not formally, by public-service workers, ... evolving under the eyes of the new ruling elites of a very old South Africa”.⁸⁸

Whilst monitoring these subjective divisions, real plans for fighting the mutually reinforcing scourges of poverty and HIV/Aids must be developed and implemented. Van Zyl Slabbert reminds us of the countless ‘historical examples that show that if there is no development accompanying the freedom that democracy promises, freedom will be destroyed. First it will be destroyed by crime, corruption and social disintegration, and then by political despotism’.⁸⁹ Besides the other destructive repercussions that insufficient development can bring, it could prove to be the most detrimental obstacle for reconciliation yet.

The country’s success in facing these challenges will depend on a number of variables – the availability of resources, policy choices, and constraints imposed on the country by global developments such as recession and war. As President Mbeki has stated:

As we enter the last year of the First Decade of Freedom, we will heed the lessons of these first ten years and build on what has been achieved ... we must together approach the Second Decade of Freedom (2004-2014), as one in which the tide of progress will sweep away the accumulated legacy of poverty and underdevelopment. [State of the Nation Address, 2003].⁹⁰

South Africa has made remarkable progress in the past decade, but efforts to improve the conditions for ordinary people have to continue.

⁸⁸ Alexander, N (2003) *An Ordinary Country*. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press. These include issue-based movements or organisations, rallying against the privatisation of municipal services, the termination of access to water and electricity, evictions for faulting on bond or rent payments, government’s refusal to roll out anti-retroviral drugs and the withholding of burial rights on white owned farms.

⁸⁹ *Financial Mail*, 8 September 2003. Pp. 24.

⁹⁰ State of the Nation Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, Houses of Parliament, Cape Town, 14 February 2003. <http://www.gov.za/speeches/sotn/sotn03.htm>